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Abstract: A well-ordered society faces a crisis whenever a sufficient number of noncompliers enter into the political system.
This has the potential to destabilize liberal democratic political order. This article provides a formal analysis of two competing
solutions to the problem of political stability offered in the public reason liberalism literature—namely, using public reason
or using convergence discourse to restore liberal democratic political order in the well-ordered society. The formal analyses
offered in this article show that using public reason fails completely, and using convergent discourse, although doing better,
has its own critical limitations that have not been previously recognized properly.
Aproblem that confronts us whenever we try toestablish a social order is dealing with noncom-pliers. John Rawls deliberately tried to avoid this
issue by restricting his theoretical task to providing prin-
ciples of justice exclusively for a well-ordered society in
which everybody “strictly complies with, and so abides
by, the principles of justice” (Rawls 2001, 13). To this,
Rawls makes it clear that his focus was on “ideal theory”
rather than “non-ideal theory” (ibid.).
The fact thatRawls focusedon“ideal theory”doesnot
mean that he did not take the issue of real-world stability
seriously. His turn to political liberalism was primarily
motivated to show how “there may exist over time a sta-
ble and just society of free and equal citizens profoundly
divided by reasonable religious, philosophical, andmoral
doctrines” (Rawls 1993/2005, xxv). His solution was to
reinterpret justice as fairness as a freestanding, political
conception of justice, which may first be endorsed by
public reason alone—that is, by reasons that everybody
considered only as free and equal democratic citizens can
all endorse—and thenbe further supportedbyanoverlap-
ping consensusbasedoneach citizen’s comprehensive (yet
reasonable) religious, philosophical, andmoral doctrines.
The type of political stability thus achieved is what
Rawls called “stability for the right reasons” (Rawls
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1993/2005, 458–60). Stability for the right reasons is
achieved when everybody endorses and is morally mo-
tivated, by her sense of justice, to follow the requirements
of the political conception of justice justified from the
same public reasons shared by all seen as free and equal
democratic citizens and, furthermore, when this fact is
known to all as a matter of common knowledge. We can
see that “stability for the right reasons” is ahighly idealized
conceptionof political stability; it is in sharp contrastwith
a somewhat more realistic conception of political stabil-
ity, which Rawls calledmodus vivendi—in which political
stability is achieved by a (mere) balance of powers.
Rawls does have an explanation of how a just
political institution that is stable for the right reasons,
once established, can be properly sustained over time.
According to Rawls, “those who grow up under just basic
institutions—institutions that justice as fairness itself
enjoins—acquire a reasoned and informed allegiance
to those institutions sufficient to render them stable”
(Rawls 2001, 185). However, one should note that the
educational effects of a well-ordered society cannot be
a complete solution to achieving stability for the right
reasons. This is not because (as many have argued) the
well-ordered society faces the problem of assurance even
among reasonable people, whosemotivation to cooperate
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is conditional upon other people’s cooperation.1 The
reason why Rawls’s educational solution is incomplete
is because it does not consider how it could cope with
the intrusion of noncooperators, who may not have been
brought up in a well-ordered society to benefit from its
educational effects.2 Such an intrusion can always happen
through a random exogenous shock—such as when a
wave of outside refugees enter into society by some unex-
pected political event—or by internal mutation.What we
want from a theory of political stability is for it to show
how a just society can be resilient against political turmoil
caused by the intrusion of such noncompliers. We want
a theory of political stability that shows how our well-
ordered society can restore social justice once it is destabi-
lized. If a well-ordered society lacks this sort of resilience,
then the political stability that was initially achieved in
a well-ordered society would be too fragile to serve as a
foundation for modern liberal democratic institutions.
Let us say that a well-ordered society faces a crisis
whenever a non-negligible proportion of rational but un-
reasonable people sufficient to destabilize liberal demo-
cratic political order have entered into themain decision-
making bodies of the political system. The question that
needs to be addressed, then, is how a well-ordered society
under crisis can restore social justice once destabilized.3
There seem to be two main solutions that have been
offered in the public reason liberalism literature: (a) using
public reason and (b) using convergence discourse. Accord-
ing to the proponents of public reason, the way public
reason can help maintain political stability in a liberal
democracy is by serving as a reliable communicative sig-
nal that assures other reasonable political officials to co-
operate their way toward social justice. That is, by only
offering shared public reasons when discussing political
matters, a public official is, in effect, sending a signal to
other public officials that she is a reasonable person who
fully endorses the shared political conception of justice of
1I personally think that the problemof assurance among reasonable
people (i.e., conditional cooperators) in a well-ordered society has
been misemphasized. If there are only conditional cooperators in a
well-ordered society, the assurance problem can actually be solved
rather trivially by any player making the first move to cooperate.
Then, the only optimal action left for theother player is to cooperate
as well, and, hence, the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium of a
well-ordered society is mutual cooperation.
2As a matter of fact, it is possible for Rawls’s educational solution
to have a negative impact on restoring political stability when there
are noncompliers in society. This will become more apparent in a
later section.
3Tobe clear, Rawls assumedhiswell-ordered society to be a “closed”
society and sidestepped the issues related to immigration. The pro-
portion of unreasonable people added to the population here need
not be immigrants. They may be those who became unreasonable
through internal mutation.
their liberal democratic society. The thought is that based
on such public signals, other reasonable political offi-
cials will be assured that they are interacting with other
reasonable people like them and will thereby be able to
restore and retain social justice by mutual political coop-
eration. For instance, Hadfield and Macedo (2012) argue
that public reason can perform a role similar to that of a
common logic (i.e., a publicly accessible standard of right
and wrong that everybody, despite her own idiosyncratic
private logic, shares) in the Hadfield-Weingast positive
model4 that helps people achieve a long-lasting stable
order by means of decentralized enforcement.
Many critics have argued that public reason is very
unlikely to perform such a stabilizing role, as it is
merely “cheap talk”—“acostless or very inexpensive, non-
binding communication” (Thrasher and Vallier 2015,
11)—that rational but unreasonable noncompliers can
readily copy to falsely assure other reasonable compliers to
cooperate, which they can then exploit for the sake of ad-
vancing their own private agendas (Gaus 2011; Thrasher
and Vallier 2015).
As a remedy,Gaus proposeswhat he calls the “conver-
gence” (as opposed to “consensus”) framework of public
justification (in short, “convergence discourse”), inwhich
the basic requirement for individuals to uphold the same
political conception of justice based on shared public rea-
son (i.e. the requirement for “stability for the right rea-
sons”) is relaxed. Instead, political stability is achieved
as long as citizens each find sufficient reasons to sup-
port the political conception of justice from their own
particular set of reasons, which may very well be based
on their comprehensive moral, religious doctrines5 (see
Gaus 2011, section 2.5).6
According to Kogelmann and Stich (2016; K&S here-
after), such a convergence framework of public justifica-
tion can provide the requisite institutional tools to solve
the problem of political stability in the well-ordered soci-
ety. The specific way convergence discourse achieves po-
litical stability is by being costly. This might at first sound
a bit paradoxical. As explained, convergence discourse re-
laxes the requirement for what counts as supporting the
4See Hadfield and Weingast (2012).
5Of course, even in a convergence conception of political stability,
Gaus claims that punishment will always be needed because of
uncertainty, a certain number of defectors, trembling hands, and
so on (Gaus 2011, section 3.2.2).
6In a different vein, Muldoon (2016) has recently argued that using
public reason to achieve and maintain stability will not be suc-
cessful, as public reason will not be able to accommodate diversity
in people’s different perspectives. To understand how perspectival
diversity may affect the proper operation of public reason and the
adjudicative role of liberal rights, see Chung & Kogelmann (2018)
and Chung (2019).
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same political conception of justice; instead of having to
support the society’s political conception of justice on the
basis of the same set of shared public reasons, individuals
may support such a conception from whatever reasons
that stem from their own comprehensive doctrines. If so,
would this not render public discourse based on conver-
gence discourse cheaper?
Whatmakes convergence discourse costly is not in its
requirement to participate in public discourse, but rather
in convincing other people to think that one is truly a
supporter of political justice. The thought is that, within
a convergence framework of public justification, to truly
convince others to believe that one truly endorses the
political conception of justice of one’s society, one would
have to exert a considerable amount of effort to learn
other people’s comprehensive doctrines to provide reasons
that can appeal to other people, not merely qua free and
equal democratic citizens, but also qua endorsers of a
particular comprehensive doctrine (K&S 2016, 724–27).
Being able to provide genuine reasons that could truly
appeal to other people’s comprehensive doctrine can
clearly separate the genuinely reasonable cooperators
from the mere posers; in K&S’s own words, doing so
serves as a “blood oath.” In short, according to K&S,
political stability can be restored and reachieved by using
convergent discourse as costly signals.
Like many articles written in the public reason
liberalism literature, K&S’s analysis on convergence
discourse is informed by modern game theory. Yet, the
game-theoretic model they present in their article is a
bit too simple to allow us to both properly understand
and critically evaluate the potential role convergence
discourse may play in achieving political stability in the
well-ordered society. The model that K&S presents in
their article is a simple assurance game (K&S 2016, 724,
Figure 4), which involves neither private information nor
a distinction of types. K&S explain that their modeling
choice was based on considerations of simplicity.7
However, if a game has only a single type of player, there
is no room to apply such concepts as cheap talk or costly
signals. This means that, technically speaking, K&S did
not provide an appropriate game-theoretical model that
matches their philosophical intuitions.
The general purpose of this article is to provide a
formal analysis of the two competing solutions (viz. pub-
lic reason vs. convergence discourse) to the problem of
instability in Rawls’s well-ordered society. The more spe-
cific purpose of this article is to provide a more accurate
7K&S write: “For simplicity we assume that we are not working
with non-polymorphic societies when it comes to preferences over
acting on P and not acting on P” (2016, 718), meaning that their
model has only one type of player.
game-theoretic model that better represents the logic of
convergence discourse, and to examine whether K&S’s
main philosophical claims can be preserved. In this sense,
this article can be read as a critical reply to Kogelmann
and Stich (2016).
The analysis that proceeds will be game-theoretic.
The next section will provide a baseline model of a well-
ordered society that faces a crisis, which includes both
a reasonable and an unreasonable type. It will then en-
dogenously determine the proportion of unreasonable
noncompliers that is sufficient todestabilize liberal demo-
cratic political order. We will see that the proportion of
unreasonable noncompliers needed for this to happen is
below majority. In the subsequent section, we will in-
vestigate whether the well-ordered society under crisis
can restore social justice and reachieve liberal democratic
stability if we allow our public officials to communicate
via public reason modeled as cheap talk. The model will
confirm that the criticisms raised by Thrasher and Val-
lier (2015) and Gaus (2011)—namely, that public reason
cannot reliably solve the problem of mutual assurance
and political stability—are accurate. We then extend our
baseline model to explore whether the problem can be
solved, as K&S claim, by allowing our public officials to
use convergence discourse as costly signals. The results of
the formal model partially support K&S’s philosophical




This section presents the baseline model of Rawls’s well-
ordered society facing a crisis. Suppose that by some un-
expected political event, a surge of refugees has entered
into our well-ordered society. Among them are people
who wish to change the well-ordered society into a per-
fectionist state in accordance with their own particular
comprehensive doctrine. Suppose that these people have
garnered a non-negligible amount of political support
and have successfully sent their representatives into the
major decision-makingbodies of their political system.As
a result, our well-ordered society is now going through a
constitutional change—a change that is practically irre-
vocable once made.
Let N = {1, 2} be the set of two public officials whose
mutual agreement would be sufficient to amend the con-
stitution of our well-ordered society under crisis in a
specific way. Let T = {r, u} be the set of types for public
official 1, where r stands for “reasonable” and u stands
for “unreasonable” in the Rawlsian sense. That is, if a
4 HUN CHUNG
public official is a reasonable type (i.e., type r ), she has
the requisite senses of justice and would be happy to live
cooperatively under the fair terms of social cooperation
proposed by the freestanding political conception of jus-
tice without having the desire to impose her particular
comprehensive doctrine on other people. By contrast, if
a public official is an unreasonable type (i.e., type u), she
has a strong desire to coerce everybody to live under her
particular comprehensive religious/moral doctrine that
she believes to be correct. We assume that both the rea-
sonable and unreasonable types are at least “rational” in
the Rawlsian sense; that is, they have the capacity to both
understand their own self-interests derived from their
own particular conception of the good and choose the
most effective means to achieve it (Rawls 1993/2005, 50).
To simplify the model, we assume that public offi-
cial 2 is fixed as a reasonable type (i.e., type r.) However,
we assume that public official 1 can either be reason-
able or unreasonable (i.e., either type r or type u). So we
are assuming one-sided incomplete information in which
public official 1 has private information concerning her
type that public official 2 does not fully know.
Each public official has two available actions: Co-
operate (denoted by c) and Defect (denoted by d). Let
A1 = A2 = A = {c , d} be the set of actions for each po-
litical official i = 1, 2. When a political official cooper-
ates, thismeans two things: (a) she proposes to amend the
constitution in away that fully honors the requirements of
the political conception of justice regulating her society,
and (b) she approveswhatever constitutional amendment
the other political official proposes. Conversely, when a
political official defects, this means that (a) she proposes
to amend the constitution with the specific intent to im-
pose her particular comprehensive doctrine throughout
society, and (b) she disapproves of whatever constitu-
tional amendment the other political official proposes.
I will not separately model the proposal and approval
stages; proposing a reasonable constitutional amendment
and approving the constitutional amendment proposed
by the other political official are lumped together under
the action label “cooperate,” and proposing an unrea-
sonable constitutional change and disapproving of the
constitutional change proposed by the other political of-
ficial are lumped together under the action label “defect.”
The main reason for doing so is because our current task
is not to analyze the specific logistics of the constitution-
making process, but to understand the destabilizing ef-
fect of the intrusions of noncompliers and whether this
destabilization can be overcome by either public reason
or convergence discourse.
A pure strategy for public official 1 is s1 : T → A1,
and a pure strategy for public official 2 is s2 ∈ A2. That
is, a pure strategy for public official 1 is a function s1(t)
that assigns an action in A1 for each type t ∈ T , and a
pure strategy for public official 2 is simply an action in
A2. (As a notational convention, I will sometimes write
this as s1t .) Let S1 denote the set of all pure strategies of
public official 1. Let Ai denote the set of all probability
distributions on Ai . Then a mixed strategy for public
official 1 is 1 : T → A1 (as a notational convention, I
will sometimes write this as 1t), and a mixed strategy for
public official 2 is 2 ∈ A2.
Let O = {Hegemony, Justice, Instability, Subjuga-
tion} be the set of possible political outcomes in our well-
ordered society. For each combination of actions per-
formed by each political official, the following outcomes
are generated:
 Hegemony when the political official herself uni-
laterally defects, whereas the other cooperates;
 Justice when both political officials cooperate;
 Instability when both political officials defect;
and
 Subjugation when the political official herself
unilaterally cooperates, whereas the other de-
fects.
In other words, each political official controls com-
plete political hegemony when she unilaterally defects
(i.e., she proposes an unreasonable constitutional change
catered to her particular comprehensive doctrine while
rejecting any constitutional amendment proposed by the
other political official), whereas the other cooperates (i.e.,
she approves any constitutional change proposed by the
other political official while proposing a reasonable con-
stitutional amendment herself); achieves mutual justice
when both cooperate (i.e., when both political officials
propose and approve constitutional amendments in ac-
cordance with the political conception of justice); suffers
political instability when both defect (i.e., when both po-
litical officials reject the other party’s proposal and try to
impose their particular comprehensive doctrine through-
out society); and suffers political subjugation when she
unilaterally cooperates, whereas the other defects (i.e.,
when she proposes constitutional amendments in accor-
dance with the political conception of justice that get
rejected, and unilaterally approves the proposal made
by the other party who intends to impose her particu-
lar comprehensive doctrine). Figure 1 represents the so-
cial outcomes that may be generated in our well-ordered
society by the combination of each political official’s
actions.
Each public official’s preferences are represented by a
payoff function ui : O × T → R, which is a function of
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the political outcome and the public official’s type—that



























H, J, and S are positive real numbers such that S> J,H>
1 > 0. The payoffs reflect the different preferences of the
reasonable (type r) and the unreasonable (type u) public
officials. We can see that although the reasonable types
most prefer to achieve mutual justice, the unreasonable
types most prefer to win complete political hegemony,
which would allow them to create a perfectionist state
in accordance with their moral/religious beliefs. That is,
although the reasonable types most prefer to live under
a well-ordered liberal democratic society—the character-
istic feature of which is what Rawls called “reasonable
pluralism”—the unreasonable types wish to monopolize
state power to coerce everybody to believe their particular
comprehensive moral/religious doctrine.
The payoffs also show that, regardless of one’s type,
the cost of beingpolitically subjugated is greater thanwhat
one can achieve positively either from political hegemony
or mutual justice (i.e., |−S| > J, H > 0). This is in ac-
cordance with the fundamental importance that Rawls
had put on securing each individual’s freedom, as well as
what Rawls called “highest-order interests.” According to
Rawls, not only do people have preferences over specific
policies that are formed on the basis of their particular
conceptions of the good, but they also have what may be
called ameta-preference for their conceptions of the good
to be formed and affirmed under conditions that are non-
coercive and free (1971/1999, 131–32). When people are
politically subjugated by another group of people, this
type of freedom—the freedom to choose and revise one’s
particular ends, which Rawls believes to be of a funda-
mental importance—gets destroyed. This is the reasoning
behind assuming |−S| > J, H > 0.
Here is a brief description of how the game is played.
Let  ∈ (0, 1] denote the proportion of unreasonable
types who have entered our well-ordered society. At the
start of the game, public official 1 is informed about his
type, which public official 2 does not know. Instead, based
on the proportion of unreasonable types who reside in
FIGURE 1 Social Outcomes in a
Well-Ordered Society
our well-ordered society, public official 2 believes that the
probability that public official 1 is unreasonable is , and
the probability that public official 1 is reasonable is 1 − .
Both public officials then simultaneously decide to play
either c (i.e., cooperate) or d (i.e., defect). The payoffs for
each public official are generated, and the game ends.
Let us call this game “the game of the well-ordered
society under crisis”; it is the well-ordered society under
“crisis,” as it presumes the existence of noncooperating,
unreasonable types. The normal (strategic) forms of the
game are presented, first described in outcomes (Figure 2)
and next described in payoffs (Figure 3).
The dotted lines indicate the respective information
sets for eachpublic official. The game shows that each type
of public official 1 knows his own type as well as the fact
that public official 2 is reasonable, whereas public official
2, while knowing that she is reasonable, believes that she
is interacting with an unreasonable political official (i.e.,
1u) with probability  > 0 and a reasonable public offi-
cial (i.e., 1r ) with probability 1 − .Note that the reason-
able types are modeled as conditional cooperators—they
prefer to cooperate when their counterpart cooperates,
and they prefer to defect when their counterpart defects.
By contrast, the unreasonable types are modeled as full
stop noncompliers; for them, defecting (i.e., playing d) is
a strictly dominant strategy.
Note that our baseline model is a one-shot game.
This is to model that our well-ordered society is facing a
crisis—going through a constitutional change thatwould,
oncemade, be practically irrevocable for an unforeseeable
future. We will follow K&S and assume that the game is
played between two high-ranked public officials (2016,
719), whose mutual agreement is sufficient to change the
constitution in a particular direction. Hence, the game
does not represent a situation in which ordinary citizens
are trying to decide whether or not to comply with the
specific requirements of their society’s law (e.g., pay
taxes); rather, the situation concerns two high-ranked
public officials deliberating about how to reorganize
the basic structure of their society by amending the
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FIGURE 2 The Game of theWell-Ordered Society under Crisis
(Outcomes)
FIGURE 3 The Game of theWell-Ordered Society under Crisis
(Payoffs)
constitution. Hence, the game represents a situation in
which penal sanctions (Rawls 1997/1999, 505) cannot ef-
fectively provide assurance that the other political official
will not try to change the constitution in an unreasonable
way.
Now, given the gravity of the situation, howwould the
strategic interactions of the two public officials unfold? As
the proportion of unreasonable types in our well-ordered
society increases, the probability that one’s cooperation
would be taken advantage of, resulting in one’s political
subjugation, increases. Given that the reasonable types
wish to avoid such political subjugations, we would ex-
pect there to be a threshold of the proportion of un-
reasonable types over which the reasonable types would
judge that it would be optimal for them to simply de-
fect. We are curious to know the minimum threshold of
unreasonable types over which it would never be sequen-
tially rational for the reasonable types to cooperate. The
following proposition identifies this minimum threshold
and further claims that it will always be below majority.
Proposition1. Let denote theminimum threshold of un-
reasonable types such that whenever > , it would never
be sequentially rational for the reasonable types (i.e., type r)
to cooperate (i.e., play c) with any positive probability. Then
 = J −1J +S−1 < 12—that is, such a threshold will always
be below majority.8
According to Proposition 1, the minimum threshold
of unreasonable types over which it is never sequentially
rational for the reasonable types to cooperate with any
positive probability is  = J −1J +S−1 . How big this value
 = J −1J +S−1 will be will depend on the two parameters S
and J—that is, the disvalue of political subjugation aswell
thevalueof justice.The specific valuesof these twoparam-
eters will depend on the two components of one’s sense of
justice that Rawls assumes: (a) the willingness to achieve
social justice by reciprocating cooperation to other coop-
erators and (b) the unwillingness to be politically subju-
gated. Component (a) determines the value of J , whereas
8See Appendix for proof.
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component (b) determines the value of S. Hence, as one’s
sense of justice becomes stronger, both parameters, S and
J , will likely increase.Whenever one’s distaste for political
subjugation (i.e., component b) becomes stronger relative
to one’s subjective value for mutual justice (i.e., compo-
nent a), the threshold  = J −1J +S−1 decreases, resulting in
a higher likelihood of social instability. Conversely, when-
ever one’s subjective value for mutual justice (i.e., com-
ponent a) becomes stronger relative to one’s distaste for
political subjugation (i.e., component b), the threshold
 = J −1J +S−1 increases (as ∂∂ J = S(J +S−1)2 > 0). However,
as proved in Proposition 1, the threshold  = J −1J +S−1 is
guaranteed to be below 12 . In other words, in the model,
the proportion of unreasonable people that is sufficient to
completely destabilize the well-ordered society is strictly
less than majority; or to say the same thing differently,
the well-ordered society can completely destabilize even
when we have a strict majority of reasonable public of-
ficials.9 With Proposition 1, we can now easily prove a
sufficient condition for complete destabilization of our
well-ordered society.
Corollary of Proposition 1. Suppose  >  = J −1J +S−1 .
Then the strategy profile ((s1u, s1r ), s2) = ((d, d), d) is the
unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) of the game of
well-ordered society under crisis.10
Corollary of Proposition 1 claims that, given that
the proportion of unreasonable types that have entered
into the well-ordered society is greater than some en-
dogenously determined threshold, which is strictly less
than one-half, the well-ordered society will necessarily
destabilize. The main mechanism that drives this result
is uncertainty. If the reasonable types were able to iden-
tify each other and avoid interacting with unreasonable
types, mutual justice would have been an equilibrium of
the game. The reason why this is not possible is because
the reasonable types are unable to distinguish other rea-
sonable types from the unreasonable types.
First Extension: TheWell-Ordered
Society under Crisis with Public
Reason
As we have seen from the previous section, the main rea-
son why the well-ordered society destabilizes under crisis
9Chung (2019) shows that the threshold of unreasonable type over
which the well-ordered society completely destabilizes can bemade
arbitrarily low whenever such an intrusion destroys the common
knowledge precondition of the well-ordered society.
10See Appendix for proof.
is due to the inability of the reasonable types to prop-
erly distinguish themselves from the unreasonable types.
Then the question is this: Would the reasonable political
officials be able to identify one another and coordinate
theirs ways toward mutual justice if they were able to sig-
nal their types to other reasonable people through the use
of public reason in such a way that reliably indicates their
firm commitment to the political conception of justice?
This section explores this possibility.
For this purpose, we extend the model and allow
public official 1 to communicate (i.e., signal) his type to
public official 2 via using public reason. Note that Rawls’s
main stance on what sort of reasons citizens in a liberal
democratic society are allowed to use when engaging in
public deliberation has changed throughout his career.
Initially, Rawls had adopted whatmany call the “exclusive
view,” according to which reasons that stem from one’s
comprehensive moral or religious doctrines should not
enter into public deliberations, full stop.However, later in
“The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” Rawls has relaxed
such a requirement and endorsed what he calls “the wide
view,” according to which
reasonable comprehensive doctrines, religious or
nonreligious, may be introduced in public polit-
ical discussion at any time, provided that in due
course proper political reasons—and not rea-
sons given solely by comprehensive doctrines—
are presented that are sufficient to support what-
ever the comprehensive doctrines introduced are
said to support. (Rawls 1993/2005, 462)
Rawls called the qualification made in the “provided
that” clause “the proviso.”Weithman interprets “the pro-
viso” as allowing “ordinary citizens to rely on their com-
prehensive doctrines without adducing public reasons in
support of their positions, so long as their doing so does
not lead others to doubt that they acknowledge the au-
thority of the public conceptionof justice” (2015, 88). The
situation that we will consider in this section is a situation
in which the sort of doubt that Weithman mentions has
arisen. More specifically, in our situation, suppose public
official 2, who is reasonable, is starting to suspect whether
public official 1 is showing proper allegiance toward the
political conception of justice undergirding their liberal
democratic society—that is, public official 2 is starting
to doubt whether public official 1 is reasonable or just
rational but unreasonable.
Here is how the game is played. At first, NATURE
determines a probability distribution over the two types
of public official 1, where  is the probability that pub-
lic official 1 is unreasonable and 1 −  is the probability
that public official 1 is reasonable. After public official
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FIGURE 4 TheWell-Ordered Society under Crisis with Public Reason
1 ascertains whether he is unreasonable or reasonable,
he must send a public message to public official 2. Let
M = {m1,m2} be the set of messages that public official
1 can send to public official 2, wherem1 denotes a public
message that relies solely on public reasons and m2 de-
notes a public message that contains nonpublic reasons.
After public official 1 sends a publicmessage, the twopub-
lic officials simultaneously decide whether to cooperate
or defect. Payoffs are generated as before. The extensive
form of the game is depicted in Figure 4.
Now, in the model, we can see that neither message
(i.e.,m1 orm2) has any effect on any of the public officials’
payoffs; payoffs are entirely determined by one’s type as
well as the combination of actions performed by each
public official. Hence, the messages in the model meet
the formal definition of cheap talk in game theory.
One question we might ask at this point is whether
modeling the use of public reason as cheap talk is plausi-
ble. I believe so. This is due to Rawls’s own commitment
to the full publicity condition of the political conception
of justice. According to Rawls,
The full justification of the public conception of
justice . . . [is] to be publicly known, or better,
at least to be publicly available. This weaker con-
dition (that full justification be available) allows
for the possibility that some will not want to
carry philosophical reflection about political life
so far, and certainly no one is required to. But if
citizens wish to, the full justification is present in
the public culture, reflected in its system of law
and political institutions, and in the main his-
torical traditions of their interpretation. (Rawls
1993/2005, 67; emphasis added)
Note how low Rawls is setting the bar for the general
use of public reason.One does not have to philosophically
reflect about it in order to use it in public life. In a well-
ordered society, public reasons are fully embeddedwithin
the political culture here and there and are readily publicly
available. This means that one does not have to exert that
much effort to use public reason in public deliberation.
Rawls had deliberately made public reason cheap and
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affordable in the well-ordered society. Hence, modeling
public reason as cheap talk is perfectly in alignment with
Rawls’s general intentions. The two major results of the
model are as follows.
Proposition 2. There exists no Perfect Bayesian Equilib-
rium (PBE) in which the reasonable types can separate
themselves from the unreasonable types and successfully
achieve justice with any positive probability.11
Proposition 3. Suppose  >  = J −1J +S−1 . Then the only
equilibrium outcome is instability.12
The formal analyses of the model as well as the for-
mal proofs of Propositions 2 and 3 are relegated to the
Appendix. Here, let us just briefly discuss informally what
these two propositions imply for our main discussion.
What Proposition 2 is essentially saying is that even
if the reasonable public officials try to coordinate with
other reasonable public officials by relying on public rea-
son, this, in general, will not work, as the unreasonable
public officials have every incentive to also send pub-
lic messages in the veneer of public reason whenever it
can induce cooperation from other reasonable public of-
ficials, which they can fully exploit to control complete
political hegemony. Remember this is possible since using
public reason in a well-ordered society (thanks to Rawls’s
own publicity condition) is virtually “for free.” Proposi-
tion 2 shows that the use of public reason will not be able
to distinguish the unreasonable public officials from the
reasonable public officials.13
11See Appendix for proof.
12See Appendix for proof.
13Here is a real-world example: In 2014, Lee Seok-ki, a member
of South Korea’s left-wing United Progressive Party (
), who was also a lawmaker of the South Korean National
Assembly at that time, was arrested and sentenced to 12 years
in prison for having links to North Korea and allegedly plotting
an armed rebellion against the South Korean government (see
https://edition.cnn.com/2014/02/17/world/asia/south-korea-lee-
rebellion-plot-conviction/index.html). Lee was a strong follower of
Juche philosophy (/), the founding philosophy
of North Korea and its official state ideology, which combines
Marxist–Leninist communism with a strong form of nationalism
with the deification of “the Great Leader” (referring to Kim
Il-sung and his “noble” bloodline). Lee, like many other Juche
philosophy followers, intended to aid North Korea in reunifying
Korea and ultimately establish a perfectionist state based on the
teachings of Juche philosophy. Lee and his party supporters have
long claimed to abolish the National Security Act (on the basis of
which he was arrested) primarily on liberal grounds—namely, that
the act violates core liberal democratic values such as freedom of
thought/expression/association and is therefore unconstitutional.
We now know that Lee’s liberal rhetoric was simply a mask to
disguise his real intentions to help create a perfectionist state under
North Korean rule on the Korean Peninsula.
Proposition 3 goes a little further. It says that when-
ever the proportion of unreasonable public officials in
government exceeds the threshold that was determined
in the previous section, not only will we not be able to
distinguish the reasonable political officials from the un-
reasonable ones by using public reason, but it will also be
impossible to restore social justice with any positive prob-
ability no matter how low. In others, despite the use of
public reason, the well-ordered society completely desta-
bilizes.
Both Propositions 2 and 3 together imply that, as a
device for mutual coordination, public reason is useless.
It confirms the criticisms raised byGaus (2011), Thrasher
and Vallier (2015), and K&S (2016)—namely, that public
reason, by being merely “cheap talk,” will not be able to
solve the problem of political stability in the well-ordered
society.14
Second Extension: TheWell-Ordered
Society under Crisis with
Convergence Discourse
We have seen that the main reason why the reasonable
public officials were unable to use public reason as a co-
ordinating device was because it was too cheap; unrea-
sonable public officials who are not actually committed
to the political conception of justice can readily afford
to use public reason to induce other public officials’ co-
operation, which they can exploit. K&S’s solution was
to make public deliberation “costly” via convergence dis-
course. The thought was that doing sowouldmake it hard
for the unreasonable public officials to mimic the signals
of the reasonable public officials.
Unlike the consensus framework of public justifi-
cation, the convergence framework of public justifica-
tion allows citizens to appeal to reasons stemming from
their comprehensive doctrines. As already explained, on
the face of it, it is unclear how this would make public
deliberation costly: If everybody is allowed to appeal to
her own comprehensive doctrine, would this not actually
make engaging in public deliberation easier and, hence,
cheaper? According to K&S, this is not so because if a
public official, who is, say, a Christian, wishes to con-
vince another public official, who is, say, a Hindu, to en-
dorse some policy p under convergence discourse, unlike
the consensus framework, the first public official would
14This is in accordance with other game-theoretic work in political
science. For instance, Austen-Smith (1990) shows that “debate”
(modeled as cheap talk) cannot elicit any new information that
would change the final outcome of a political process.
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have to expend a considerable amount of effort to learn
the details of Hinduism to provide Hindu-based reasons
in support of policy p to fully convince the second public
official. “That [the first public official] would bewilling to
incur such a cost indicates that she is serious about achiev-
ing the [mutual justice] outcome” (K&S 2016, 724–5).
Let us now extend our baseline model to incorpo-
rate this logic of convergence discourse. Consider again
our well-ordered society under crisis. Suppose  >  =
J −1
J +S−1 ; that is, the proportion of unreasonable public of-
ficials in our well-ordered society exceeds the threshold
that is sufficient to destabilize liberal democratic political
order. Let there be N ∈ N comprehensive doctrines in
our well-ordered society and let public official 2, who is
reasonable, be committed to one of the N comprehensive
doctrines.
Here is the timing of the model. At first, NATURE
gives a probability distribution (, 1 − ) to the two
types of public official 1—that is, the unreasonable type
(i.e., type u) and the reasonable type (i.e., type r ). Each
type of public official 1, knowing his type, decides on the
amount of effort to exert to learn the various compre-
hensive doctrines in his society. Let eu ≥ 0 be the amount
of effort expended by the unreasonable type (i.e., type
u) of public official 1 and er ≥ 0 be the amount of ef-
fort expended by the reasonable type (i.e., type r ) of
public official 1. Given effort level e ≥ 0, the probability
that each type of public official 1 learns public official
2’s comprehensive doctrine is min{1, eN }. Also, exerting
e ≥ 0 amount of effort costs the public official the same
amount e ≥ 0 that gets subtracted from his final payoff.
Note that each type of public official 1 can learn public of-
ficial 2’s comprehensive doctrine for certain by expending
e ≥ N amount of effort. As N is the number of compre-
hensive doctrines in society, we can see that when there
are more comprehensive doctrines in society, the amount
of effort that would be required for each type of public of-
ficial 1 to learn public official 2’s comprehensive doctrine
for certain increases. To put it another way, learning pub-
lic official 2’s comprehensive doctrine becomes costlier as
society becomes more diverse. This is in line with what
will be referred to as K&S’s “the more diversity the better
(MDB) thesis,” according to which
The signal from Row’s convergence discourse is
significantly more costly in the large diversity
case than in the small diversity case . . . . [T]he
more comprehensive doctrines there are to learn,
the greater the chance that Row’s costly signal
can overcome the too cheap talk problem. Thus,
although Rawls views diversity as creating a sta-
bility problem that must be solved, we conclude
that diversity is an integral part of the solution to
this very same problem—the too cheap talk prob-
lem. (K&S 2016, 726; emphasis in original)
Wewill soon provide amore in-depth formal analysis
ofK&S’sMDB thesis afterwe characterize the equilibrium
of the model.
To continue, we assume that public official 2 does not
directly observe the specific effort levels expended by each
type of public official 1. Instead, once each type of public
official 1 exerts effort, public official 2 receives a signal:
a “good” signal (g ) if a given type of public official 1
has successfully learned public official 2’s comprehensive
doctrine, and a “bad” signal (b) otherwise. We assume
that the signal that public official 2 receives is also private
information; that is, which specific signal public official
2 has received is unobservable to each type of public
official 1.Afterpublicofficial 2 receives a signal, both types
of public official 1 and public official 2 simultaneously
decide whether to cooperate or to defect. Once they do,
payoffs are generated as in our baseline model.
Again, our solution concept is perfect Bayesian equi-
librium (PBE). We have seen from Proposition 1 that,
given  >  = J −1J +S−1 , the well-ordered society under
crisis will never succeed in restoring social justicewith any
positive probability. We have seen in the previous section
that this result is unchanged even if we allow the public
officials to use public reason as a public communicative
signal. We now wish to examine whether convergent dis-
course can solve our current predicament as K&S (2016)
claim.
It is worth noting that the current extension incor-
porating the logic of convergence discourse has multiple
PBEs, many of which do no better than public reason.
Hence, we are interested in finding a PBE in which con-
vergence discourse is successful. Specifically, we are inter-
ested in finding a PBE in which public official 2 cooper-
ates if public official 1 successfully learns public official
2’s comprehensive doctrine (i.e., if public official 2 re-
ceives the “good” (g ) signal) and defects otherwise (i.e., if
public official 2 receives the “bad” (b) signal); the reason-
able type of public official 1 exerts a positive amount of
effort to learn public official 2’s comprehensive doctrine;
and the well-ordered society under crisis achieves mutual
justice with positive probability. Let us call such a PBE a
convergence discourse equilibrium (CDE):
Convergence Discourse Equilibrium (CDE): A
CDE in a well-ordered society under crisis is a
PBE in which public official 2 cooperates after
observing signal g and defects after observing
signal b; the reasonable type (i.e., type r ) of pub-
lic official 1 exerts positive effort (i.e., er > 0);
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and the outcome “mutual justice” is achieved
with positive probability.
One natural thing to ask is whether such a CDE will
always exist in the well-ordered society under crisis once
we introduce convergence discourse. The answer is a dis-
appointing “no.”
Proposition 4. Suppose  >  = J −1J +S−1 . Then there ex-
ists no convergence discourse equilibrium if the value of
political hegemony (H) is sufficiently large, specifically,
when H > N.15
What Proposition 4 is saying is this. When the unrea-
sonable type of public official 1’s desire to achieve political
hegemony is strong relative to the number of compre-
hensive doctrines in our well-ordered society under crisis
(i.e., HN > 1), the optimal level of effort is eu = N; that
is, the unreasonable type of public official 1 will learn
every comprehensive doctrine in his society. When this
happens, public official 2’s strategy to cooperate after ob-
serving that public official 1 has learned public official 2’s
comprehensive doctrine is no longer sustainable. This is
so because the fact that public official 2 received a “good”
(g ) signal no longer gives any reason for public official 2 to
believe that her counterpart ismore likely to be reasonable
than before, as the good signal could have equally been
produced by an unreasonable counterpart. It is obvious
that there can be no CDE in this case, and, as a result, our
well-ordered society destabilizes completely just as it was
the case when the public officials relied on public reason.
This shows that introducing convergence discourse
does not somehowmagically solve the problem that pub-
lic reason failed to solve. Based on our analysis, a neces-
sary condition for a CDE to exist is HN ≤ 1 ⇒ H ≤ N.
That is, either the number of comprehensive doctrines
must be sufficiently large or the unreasonable type’s de-
sire to achieve political hegemony must be sufficiently
weak; whenever this fails, there is no CDE.
So, for the purpose of our argument, let us assume
that H ≤ N. That is, let us assume that relative to the
number of comprehensive doctrines that coexist in our
well-ordered society under crisis, conditions are relatively
favorable in the sense that the unreasonable types’ desire
to achieve political hegemony is not too strong. Can con-
vergence discourse now perform the role that K&S hopes
it will perform by restoring social justice and political sta-
bility by serving as a costly signal? To answer this question
in the affirmative, we must show that a CDE exists. For-
tunately, a CDE does exist, which the next proposition
demonstrates:
15See Appendix for proof.
Proposition 5. Suppose  >  = J −1J +S−1 and suppose
H ≤ N. Then the following assessment constitutes a con-
vergence discourse equilibrium:






 Public official 1’s (type r ) strategy
s1r =
{
er = NSJ +S−1
C (cooperate)
;
 Public official 2’s strategy
s2 =
{
C (cooperate) after observing g
D (defect) after observing b
;
 1u’s beliefs: believes that he has generated signal
b with probability 1;
 1r ’s beliefs: believes that he has generated sig-
nal g with probability SJ +S−1 and signal b with
probability 1 − SJ +S−1 ;




after observing g , believes that 1 = 1u
for certain after observing b,
believes 1 = 1u with probability

+(1−)(1− SJ +S−1 )
.16
TheCDE that we have just found shows that itmay be
possible, under relatively favorable conditions, for conver-
gence discourse to solve the problem that public reason
failed to solve—namely, the problem of restoring social
justice and maintaining political stability when the well-
ordered society faces a crisis. In the previous section, we
saw that whenever the proportion of unreasonable types
who have intruded into our well-ordered society exceeds
 = J −1J +S−1 , relying on public reason was a sure way to
completely destabilize our well-ordered society. Proposi-
tion 5 shows that, given that the political ambitions of
the unreasonable types who are threatening the politi-
cal stability of the well-ordered society are not too high,
relying on convergence discourse may help restore and
maintain social justice and political order by serving as a
costly signal that the unreasonable types cannot be rea-
sonably expected to mimic. This partially confirms that
K&S’s (2016) ‘solution’ can actually be a solution to the
problem that a well-ordered society under crisis creates.
However, there are reasons to think that we should not be
too optimistic.
The biggest problem is that even when conditions
are relatively favorable in the sense that the political am-
bitions of the unreasonable types are not too high (i.e.,
even when H ≤ N), the CDE that we found in Proposi-
tion 5 is not the only equilibrium of the model; as a matter
16See Appendix for proof.
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of fact, there is a continuum of (that is, infinitely many)
equilibria in which our well-ordered society under crisis
will destabilize completely despite the use of convergence
discourse. The next proposition characterizes a family of
such PBEs in which instability is the unique equilibrium
outcome of our well-ordered society under crisis despite
the use of convergence discourse:
Proposition 6. Suppose  >  = J −1J +S−1 and suppose
H ≤ N. Then the following characterizes a family of PBEs
(that are not CDEs) in which our well-ordered society com-
pletely destabilizes:












 Public official 2’s strategy
s2 =
{
D(defect) after observing g
D (defect) after observing b
;
 1u’s beliefs: believes that he or she has generated
signal b with probability 1;
 1r ’s beliefs: believes that he or she has generated
signal b with probability 1;




after observing g , believes that 1 = 1u
with probability (where > )
after observing b,
believes 1 = 1uwith probability
.17
What Proposition 6 shows is that even under rela-
tively favorable conditions in which the political ambi-
tions of the unreasonable types are not too strong, our
well-ordered society under crisis can very well destabilize
completely despite the use of convergence discourse.
What is more is that even when convergence dis-
course does work successfully and our well-ordered so-
ciety under crisis is in the good CDE, we still cannot
say that it is a complete solution to restore social jus-
tice and political stability in the well-ordered society. In
the CDE discovered in Proposition 5, the probability that
our well-ordered society under crisis will be able to re-
store political justice by using convergence discourse is
P ∗ = (1 − )( SJ +S−1 ). (This is the probability that the
reasonable type of public official 1 succeeds in learning
public official 2’s comprehensive doctrine.) Given our pa-
rameters (viz. JJ +S <  ≤ 1, S > J > 1), P ∗ is guaran-
teed to be below 1. That is, even when using convergence
discourse as a costly signal successfully, there will always
17See Appendix for proof.
be some positive probability that our well-ordered society
under crisis will fail to restore social justice and destabi-
lize nonetheless. So even when our well-ordered society
under crisis is in the good convergence discourse equi-
librium, using convergence discourse as a costly signal
does not completely solve the problem; it only solves the
problem sometimes.
So how often is “sometimes”? To examine this,
let us do some comparative statics. We can see that
P ∗ = (1 − )( SJ +S−1 ) (i.e., the probability that our well-
ordered society under crisis restores and maintains social
justice and political order by using convergence discourse
as a costly signal) is determined by three parameters: 
(the proportion of unreasonable types who have intruded
into society); J (how much the reasonable types value
mutual justice); and S (the magnitude of the disvalue of
being politically subjugated.) Consequently, wemaywrite
P ∗(, J, S). To see how P ∗(, J, S) responds to a change
in each parameter, let us take the partial derivatives of
P ∗(, J, S) with respect to each parameter:
 ∂P∗(,J,S)
∂
= −SJ +S−1 < 0
 ∂P∗(,J,S)
∂ J = −(1−)S(J +S−1)2 < 0
 ∂P∗(,J,S)
∂S = −(1−)(1−J )(J +S−1)2 > 0
Thequalitative interpretations of these partial deriva-
tives would amount to this. The probability that the well-
ordered society that faces a crisis successfully restores
social justice and maintains political stability by using
convergence discourse as a costly signal (a) decreases as
more unreasonable types intrude into society (i.e., when
 increases), (b) decreases as the reasonable types value
mutual justice more strongly (i.e., when J increases), and
(c) increases as the reasonable types disvalue political sub-
jugation more strongly (i.e., when S increases.) Figure 5
summarizes this graphically.
Component (a) and (c) seem natural; one would ex-
pect that it would be harder to restore social justice even
with costly signaling if there are more unreasonable types
in society, and one would also expect that the reasonable
types will expend more effort to learn the comprehen-
sive doctrines in their society to signal (to other reason-
able types) their genuine intention to cooperate the more
they fear being politically subjugated by the unreasonable
types, which results in a higher probability of the conver-
gencediscourse solution succeeding.What onemight find
surprising is component (b)—namely, that the probabil-
ity that our well-ordered society under crisis successfully
restores social justice and maintains political stability by
using convergence discourse decreases as reasonable peo-
ple start to valuemutual justicemore strongly. Thismeans
that, unlike Rawls’s prediction, the educational effects of
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FIGURE 5 Comparative Statics: Graph of P ∗
the well-ordered society (Rawls 2001, 185) might actu-
ally engender the seeds for its very own destabilization
whenever the well-ordered society faces a crisis.
Let us now examine what I have called K&S’s MDB
(the more diversity the better) thesis. According to the
MDB thesis, themore diverse the society (i.e., as the num-
ber of comprehensive doctrines increases), the easier it
will be for convergence discourse to solve the problem of
political stability in a well-ordered society facing a crisis.
The MDB thesis is partially supported by the model.
As we already know, a necessary condition for our
CDE to exist is H ≤ N. That is, the unreasonable type’s
desire to achieve political hegemony must be sufficiently
weak relative to the number of comprehensive doctrines
that coexist in the well-ordered society. We can see that
this condition will be easier to be met as N gets larger.
Whenever this condition is met, expending zero effort
(i.e., eu = 0) will be the only effort level that would be
sequentially rational for the unreasonable types, given
public official 2’s strategy to cooperate after observing a
“good” (g) signal and to defect after observing a “bad” (b)
signal. This means that whenever N is sufficiently large
(i.e., whenever the well-ordered society is sufficiently di-
verse), the unreasonable typeswill simply give up learning
any of their society’s comprehensive doctrines. In con-
trast, in the CDE, the reasonable types will always exert
positive effort to learn their society’s comprehensive doc-
trines. So whenever a reasonable official finds that her
counterpart has sufficiently learned her comprehensive
doctrine, she will know for sure that her counterpart is
also reasonable, and, from this, both political officials can
cooperate towardmutual justice. To this extent, theMDB
thesis is true.
However, there is a flip side to this. As we have seen,
whenever H > N, that is, whenever the unreasonable
types’ desire to achieve political hegemony becomes suffi-
ciently large, theunreasonable typeswill learn every single
comprehensive doctrine in the well-ordered society they
infiltrated.Hence, a reasonable typewill no longer be able
to distinguish the reasonable types from an unreasonable
type simply by observing whether or not her counterpart
has successfully learned her comprehensive doctrine. As
demonstrated from Proposition 4, whenever this hap-
pens, the well-ordered society will necessarily destabilize,
and convergence discourse will no longer serve as a viable
solution to the problem.
Hence, we may say that promoting diversity is a
double-edged sword. It may make it easier for a well-
ordered society under crisis to restore social justice and
political stability via the means of convergence discourse,
but it may also destroy this very possibility if it goes too
far to promote religious fundamentalists and extremist
comprehensive doctrines (whose desires to achieve polit-
ical hegemony are unusually strong). To the extent that
diversity promotes extremist views in society, the MDB
thesis is false. This is a reason why we might want to con-
tain diversity in a reasonable way. This sort of thingmight
be what Rawls had in mind when he claimed that “polit-
ical liberalism takes for granted not simply pluralism but
the fact of reasonable pluralism” (Rawls 1993/2005, xviii;
emphasis added).
Concluding Remarks
Any theory of political stability must take into consid-
eration the potential disruptive effects of noncompliers.
This is because if a political system is prone to destabilize
with the introduction of a small number of unreasonable
public officials who have the power to restructure the
political system, then this shows that the political stabil-
ity initially achieved was too fragile to serve as a basis for
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modern liberal political institutions. In this sense, Rawls’s
theory of political stability (i.e., “stability for the right rea-
sons”) is incomplete, as it simply assumes the existence of
noncompliers away. Thrasher and Vallier (2018) have re-
cently argued that this type of closed-ness is one of the
key defects of Rawls’s conception of the well-ordered so-
ciety and have proposed an alternate model of a liberal
democratic society, which they call “the open society,”
according to which constitutional rules, while remain-
ing stable, still “preserve the social conditions that foster
experimentation, while leaving room in legal and institu-
tional rules for innovation and change” (398).
In this article, we have examined whether the two
prominent solutions offered in the public reason liberal-
ism literature—namely, using public reason or using con-
vergence discourse—can restore social justice and main-
tain political stability when the well-ordered society faces
a crisis, particularly when the proportion of unreasonable
public officials who have intruded into the well-ordered
society exceeds some endogenously determined thresh-
old. The formal analyses offered in this article shows that
using public reason fails completely, whereas using con-
vergent discourse, although slightly better, has its own
critical limitations. Despite Rawls’s high hopes, it seems
that achieving “stability for the right reasons” and success-
fully maintaining it is not something that can be achieved
so easily.
There are many ways in which the main models pre-
sented in this article canbe further extended.Onepossible
way is to divide the unreasonable types into two sub-
categories (e.g., unreasonable type A and unreasonable
type B) and add a third public official who is assumed
to be a given unreasonable type. By assuming that the
unreasonable types of the same type can credibly iden-
tify and cooperate with each other, we may be able to
examine the extent to which coalitional assortment can
affect the proper operations of public reason and con-
vergence discourse. Another possible way to extend the
model is to introduce additional periods and assume that
the status quo of the well-ordered society under crisis
worsens the longer it takes for the well-ordered society
to restore justice. In such a setup, the reasonable types
will face a trade-off; they can cooperate in the current
period while facing a risk of turning the well-ordered so-
ciety into a perfectionist state or they can stall the political
process for another round with the hope of uncovering
the other political official’s type while the crisis worsens.
These and other possible extensions are left for future
research.
Although the primary focus of this article was to
examine, through formal game-theoretic analysis, the ef-
fectiveness of the two prominent solutions that have been
offered to restore political order in Rawls’s well-ordered
society, the results of the paper have broader implications
for the theory of deliberative democracy more generally.
The crucial idea of the theory of deliberative democracy
is that a given policy proposal is legitimate to the extent
that it can be justified by reasons that thosewho are trying
to find fair terms of social cooperation among free and
equal persons cannot reasonably reject (Cohen 1997, 73;
Gutman and Thomson 2004, 3). However, what the for-
mal results of this article show is that whether or not
a given policy proposal is well supported by good rea-
sons may not in itself be sufficient for its stable public
endorsement and implementation if there exists reason-
able suspicion among the decision-making parties about
the genuine intentions of their decision-making counter-
parts.
I would like to end by noting that the application
of formal game-theoretic analysis has proved to be fruit-
ful in identifying the specific conditions and institutional
requirements under which democratic deliberation can
successfully achieve themany normative aims that demo-
cratic theorists havehoped. It hasbeen shown that the suc-
cess of democratic deliberation in achieving better out-
comes through information sharing can heavily depend
on the postdeliberation voting rule (Austen-Smith and
Feddersen 2006; Coughlan 2000; Mathis 2011); and con-
trary to the received wisdom among deliberative demo-
cratic theorists, informational efficiencymay even be bet-
ter served by unequal and asymmetric standing of the
speakers with respect to the deliberative procedure (Hafer
and Landa 2007). More generally, game-theoretic analy-
ses have made it clear that different deliberative environ-
ments can provide different incentive structures that may
either promote or hinder successful deliberation among
strategic actors (Landa and Meirowitz 2009).
Any normative political theory presumes an under-
standing of the positive processes of its proposed insti-
tutional arrangement. As such, game-theoretic analysis,
by offering a better understanding of the positive pro-
cesses of different kinds of deliberative institutions, can
greatly help the normative theorizing of democratic the-
orists by showing what can and what cannot be realisti-
cally expected from the practical implementation of their
normative political theories. This is why there should be
more fruitful collaborations among formal/positive and
normative political theorists.
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Appendix: Proofs and Technical
Details
Proposition 1. Let  denote the minimum threshold of
unreasonable types such that whenever  > , it would
never be sequentially rational for the reasonable types (i.e.
type r) to cooperate (i.e. play c) with any positive probabil-
ity. Then,  = J −1J +S−1 < 12 – that is, such a threshold will
always be below majority.
Proof. For public official 1u, defecting (i.e. playing
d) strictly dominates cooperating (i.e. playing c). Hence,
s1u = d is the only sequentially rational strategy for public
official 1u. Let 1r (c) = p – that is, let p denote the
probability that public official 1r cooperates (i.e. play c).
Then, for public official 2, the expected payoff of defecting
(i.e. playing d) is:
EU 2 (d) =  · 0 + (1 − ) (p · 1 + (1 − p) · 0)
= (1 − ) p
Similarly, the expected payoff of cooperating (i.e. playing
c) is:
EU 2 (c) =  · (−S) + (1 − ) (p · J + (1 − p) · (−S))
= − (J + S) p + (J + S) p − S
It is sequentially rational for public official 2 to defect
if:
EU 2 (d) > EU 2 (c)
(1 − ) p > − (J + S) p + (J + S) p − S
(J + S − 1) p > (J + S − 1) p − S
 >
(J + S − 1) p − S
(J + S − 1) p · · · (∗)
Let (p) = (J +S−1)p−S(J +S−1)p . Then, we have ′(p) =
S
(J +S−1)p2 > 0. Hence, the right-hand side of the inequal-
ity (∗), i.e. (p) is a strictly increasing function of p ∈
[0, 1], which takes its maximum value (1) = J −1(J +S−1) .
Set  = J −1J +S−1 . Then, whenever  > , it is never se-
quentially rational for public official 2 to cooperate re-
gardless of the value of p ∈ [0, 1]. Hence, s2 = d when-
ever  > . Knowing that public official 2 will optimally
defect whenever  > , it is sequentially rational for the
public official 1r to defect as well. Hence, s1r = d when-
ever  > . Hence, whenever  > , it is never sequen-
tially rational for any reasonable types to cooperate with
positive probability. To show that  = J −1J +S−1 is the min-
imum threshold of unreasonable types over which it is
never sequentially rational for the reasonable types to co-
operate, it suffices to show that, for any lower threshold,
it would be possible for there to exist a positive probabil-
ity with which playing c would be sequentially rational
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for public official 2. So, pick any  > 0, and suppose we
set  = J −1J +S−1 − . Suppose  >  = J −1J +S−1 − . From
(∗), it would be sequentially rational for public official
2 to cooperate if and only if  ≤ (J +S−1)p−S(J +S−1) . Suppose
p = 1. Then, whenever  = J −1J +S−1 −  <  ≤ J −1J +S−1 ,
it would be sequentially rational for public official 2 to
cooperate. Hence, ∀ > 0,  = J −1J +S−1 −  cannot be the
minimum threshold. I conclude that  = J −1J +S−1 is the
minimum threshold as required. Finally, I claim that
 = J −1J +S−1 < 12 . Otherwise, J −1J +S−1 ≥ 12 ⇒ 2(J − 1) ≥
J + S − 1 ⇒ J − S ≥ 1, which is impossible as S > J
by assumption. 
Corollary of Proposition 1. Suppose  >  = J −1J +S−1 .
Then, the strategy profile, ((s1u, s1r ), s2) = ((d, d), d) is
the unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) of the game
of well-ordered society under crisis.
Proof. For the unreasonable type of public official 1,
playing d strictly dominates playing c . Therefore, s1u = d
is the only sequentially rational strategy unreasonable
type of public official 1. By the proof of the Proposition
1, given  >  = J −1J +S−1 , s2 = s1r = d are the only set
of sequentially rational strategies for public official 2 and
the reasonable type of public official 1. Therefore, the
strategy profile ((s1u, s1r ), s2) = ((d, d), d) is the unique
Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) of the well-ordered
society under crisis. 
Technical Details of Section 3: The Game of
Well-ordered Society under Crisis with
Public Reason
To analyze the game in Figure 4 more formally, we
would need to introduce some more notations. We can
see that the game contains a total of 15 nodes. Let
X = {x0, x1, . . . , x14} be the set of all nodes in the game.
Each node in X can be identified with a sequence of ac-
tions played up to that point. Specifically, let:
x0 = ()
x1 = (u)





x7 = (u,m1, d)
x8 = (u,m1, c)
x9 = (r,m1, d)
x10 = (r,m1, c)
x11 = (u,m2, d)
x12 = (u,m2, c)
x13 = (r,m2, d)
x14 = (r,m2, c)
For instance, x0 = () denotes the initial node at
which NATURE determines the probability distribution
over the two types of public official 1, and x7 = (g ,m1, d)
denotes the node that is reached after NATURE deter-
mines public official 1 as a reasonable type, public official
1 sends the message using public reason (i.e. sends m1),
and, then, public official 2 attacks.
The set I = X\{x0} can be partitioned into eight
information sets such that I = {I1, . . . , I8} where I1 =
{x1}, I2 = {x2}, I3 = {x3, x4}, I4 = {x5, x6}, I5 =
{x7, x8}, I6 = {x9, x10}, I7 = {x11, x12}, I8 = {x13, x14}.
Let (Ii ) denote the public official whose turn
it is to play at information set Ii (i = 1, . . . , 8). So,
we have (I1) = (I5) = (I7) = 1u, (I2) = (I6) =
(I8) = 1r, and (I3) = (I4) = 2. Let A(Ii ) denote
the set of actions available to (Ii ) at Ii . So, A(I1) =
A(I2) = M = {m1,m2} and A(Ii ) = A = {d, c} for i =
3, 4, . . . , 8.
A behavioral strategy of public official (Ii ) at infor-
mation set Ii is(Ii ) : Ii → A(Ii ) – that is, a behavioral
strategy of public official (Ii ) at information set Ii is a
probability distribution on the actions available at the in-
formation set Ii . For a1 ∈ A(Ii ), let (Ii )(a1|Ii ) denote
the probability with which public official (Ii ) plays a1 at
information set Ii . Let  = (1m,1r ,2) be the profile
of behavioral strategies for public officials 1 and 2.
A system of beliefs  = (I1, . . . ,I8 ) is a profile of
probability distributions, one for each information set Ii ,
such that for all Ii ∈ I , Ii (x) ∈ [0, 1] for all x ∈ Ii and∑
x∈Ii
Ii (x) = 1.
Let u(Ii )(|Ii ,Ii ) denote the payoff of public offi-
cial (Ii ) at information set II with beliefs Ii and strate-
gies .
An assessment (,) is a pair consisting of a profile of
behavioral strategies and a system of beliefs. Our solution
concept is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE).
An assessment (,) is a PBE if:
1. It is sequentially rational–that is, for all Ii ∈ I
and all ′(Ii ),
u(Ii )(|Ii ,Ii ) ≥ u(Ii )(′(Ii ),−(Ii ) |Ii ,Ii )
And
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1. All beliefs obey Bayes’ rule whenever possible – that
is, for all Ii ∈ I such that Pr[Ii |] > 0,
I i (x) =
Pr[x|]
Pr[Ii |] for all x ∈ Ii .
We are now ready to state and prove Propositions 2
and 3:
Proposition2. There exists no PBE inwhich the reasonable
types can separate themselves from the unreasonable types
and successfully achieve justice with positive probability.
Proof. Suppose not. Then, there exists a separating
PBE in which 1r and 2 play c with positive probability. Let
the assessment (,) be any such separating PBE. Since
(,) is separating, we must have: 1u(I1) = 1r (I2).
Without loss of generality, suppose 1u(m1|I1) = 0 and
1u(m1|I2) = 1 (i.e. suppose that public official 1 sends
the message using public reason when he/she is a reason-
able type, and sends themessage using non-public reason
when he/she is an unreasonable type.) Since, in a PBE,
beliefs are assigned according to Bayes’ rule whenever
possible, we must have I3 (x3) = 0 and I4 (x5) = 1 (i.e.
given that public official 2 receives a message encoded in
public reason, public official 2 knows for sure that public
official 1 is a reasonable type) Sincedefecting strictlydom-
inates cooperating for the unreasonable types, we must,
by sequential rationality, have1u(d|I5) = 1u(d|I7) = 1.
Givenm2 (i.e. given that public official 2 receives themes-
sage in non-public reason), defecting gives public official
2 a payoff of 0, while cooperating gives public official
2 a payoff of −S. Therefore, by sequential rationality,
2(d|I4) = 1. This results in a payoff of 0 for 1u (i.e. the
unreasonable type of public official 1). Let 2(c |I3) = q .
By assumption, q ∈ (0, 1) (i.e. once receiving themessage
in public reason, public official 2 will cooperate with pos-
itive probability.) If 1u in I1 deviated to 1u(m1|I1) = 1
and played defect afterwards, then this will give him/her
a payoff of: q · H + (1 − q) · 0 = q · H > 0. So, this is
a profitable deviation. So, 1u(m1|I1) = 0 is not sequen-
tially rational. This contradicts that1u(m1|I1) = 0 is part
of a PBE. 
Proposition 3. Suppose >  = J −1J +S−1 . Then, the only
equilibrium outcome is instability.
Proof. Suppose not. Then, there exists a PBE inwhich
the equilibrium outcome is not instability. This can hap-
pen only if both 1r and 2 play cwith positive probability in
some information set reached with positive probability.
Let the assessment (,) be any such PBE.
First, by Proposition 2, (,) cannot be a separating
equilibrium.
Second, I claim that (,) cannot be a pooling
equilibrium. For, suppose not. Then, either 1u(m1|I1)
= 1r (m1|I2) = 1 or 1u(m1|I1) = 1r (m1|I2) = 0.
Without loss of generality, suppose 1u(m1|I1) =
1r (m1|I2) = 1.Then,I3 (x3) =  andI3 (x4) = 1 − .
We can see that the game has essentially been reduced to
the baseline model that we have seen in section 2. Since
 >  = J −1J +S−1 , by Proposition 1, it is never sequen-
tially rational for any reasonable type to cooperate with
any positive probability, which contradicts our assump-
tion that both 1r and 2 public official 2 cooperates with
positive probability.
Therefore, the only possibility left is for (,) to
be a semi-separating equilibrium. Let 1u(m1|I1) = w ∈
(0, 1) and 1r (m1|I2) = z ∈ (0, 1). Since (,) is semi-
separating, the information sets I3 and I4 are reached
with positive probability. By assumption, public official 2
needs to cooperatewith positive probability in at least one
of these information sets. Without loss of generality, sup-
pose that public official 2 cooperates with positive prob-
ability in I3; that is, 2(c |I3) ∈ (0, 1]. In order for play-
ing c with positive probability to be sequentially rational
for public official 2 in I3, we must have I3 (x3) ≤ JS+J ,
or else, playing d will strictly dominate playing c, and,
hence, playing c with positive probability will not be se-
quentially rational. Since S > J, JS+J <
1
2 . Hence, in order
for I3 (x3) ≤ JS+J < 12 , we must have w < z. This im-
plies 1u(m2|I1) = (1 − w) > (1 − z) = 1r (m2|I2). By





such beliefs, playing d strictly dominates playing c for
public official 2 in I4. Therefore, sequential rational-
ity requires 2(d|I4) = 1. Given 2(d|I4) = 1, sequential
rationality requires 1u(d|I7) = 1r (d|I8) = 1. (In other
words, the bottom portion of the game results in Instabil-
ity.) Such a combination of strategies gives 1u a payoff of:
w[2 (c |I3) (H) + (1 − 2 (c |I3)) · 0] + (1 − w) (0)
= w · 2 (c |I3) (H) .
If 1u deviated to 1u(m1|I1) = 1, then his/her pay-
off would become: 2(c |I3)(H). Since w ∈ (0, 1), this is
a strictly profitable deviation. Therefore, 1u(m1|I1) =
w is not sequentially rational. This contradicts that
1u(m1|I1) = w is part of a PBE. This shows that there
cannot be a semi-separating PBE in which 1r and 2 co-
operate with positive probability in the equilibrium path.
We have exhausted all cases. Therefore, we conclude that
there exists no PBE in which the equilibrium outcome is
not Instability. 
Proposition 4. Suppose  >  = J −1J +S−1 . Then, there ex-
ists no CDE if the value of political hegemony (H) is suffi-
ciently large (i.e. H > N.)
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Proof. Assume  >  = J −1J +S−1 and H > N. Sup-
pose, contrary to the claim, that there exists a CDE. By
the definition of a CDE, public official 2 cooperates after
observing signal g and defects after observing signal b.
Call this strategy s2 (i.e. s2(g ) = c and s2(b) = d). Now,
a strategy for each type of public official 1’s consists of
two parts: the first part specifies the amount of effort to
learn public official 2’s comprehensive doctrine, and the
second part specifies whether to cooperate or defect. We
know that defection strictly dominates cooperation for
the unreasonable type of public official 1(i.e. 1u) in the
second stage of the game. Hence, the only strategy that
could be supported by sequential rationality for 1u af-
ter public official 2 observes a signal (either g or b) is
to defect. (So, s1u = D will form the second part of the
unreasonable type of public official 1’s strategy.) Now,
let us deduce the optimal amount of effort eu ≥ 0 for
1u, which will constitute the first part of 1u’s strategy.
Note that any effort level greater than N is strictly domi-
nated by effort level eu = N (as expending a greater effort
level than N would not increase the probability of learn-
ing public official 2’s comprehensive doctrine and would
only incur a greater cost.) So, in any equilibrium, wemust
have eu ∈ [0, N]. Given public official 2’s strategy s2 (i.e.
s2(g ) = c and s2(b) = d), the expected payoff of expend-
ing eu ≥ 0 amount of effort for the unreasonable type of
public official 1 is:
EU 1u (eu|s2) = eu
N












· · · (∗)
Since H > N by assumption, we have HN − 1 > 0,
which means that the expected payoff for 1u (i.e. equa-
tion (∗)) is increasing in eu, i.e. the amount of effort ex-
pended. Hence, the optimal level of effort for 1u becomes
eu = N. By expending eu = N amount of effort, 1u gen-
erates a ‘good signal (g )’ with probability 1. But then,
after observing the g , player 2 believes (after Bayesian up-
dating) that the probability that s/he is facing an unrea-
sonable type is at least  >  = J −1J +S−1 . By Proposition
1, whenever  > , it is never sequentially rational for
the reasonable types (i.e. type r ) to cooperate (i.e. play
c) with any positive probability, which contradicts our
initial assumption that s2(g ) = c is part of a CDE and
hence sequentially rational. 
Proposition 5. Suppose  >  = J −1J +S−1 and suppose
H ≤ N. Then the following assessment constitutes a CDE:






 Public official 1 (type r )’s strategy
s1r =
{
er = NSJ +S−1
C(cooperate)
;
 Public official 2’s strategy
s2 =
{
C(cooperate) after observing g
D(defect) after observing b
;
 1u’s beliefs: believe that s/he has generated signal
‘b’ with probability 1;
 1r ’s beliefs: believe that s/he has generated signal ‘g’
with probability SJ +S−1 and signal ‘b’ with proba-
bility 1 − SJ +S−1 .




after observing g , believes that 1 = 1u
for sure after observing b, believes
1 = 1uwith probability

+(1−)(1− SJ +S−1 )
Proof. First, let us verify that the stated assessment
is a PBE. To do so, let us verify that 1u’s strategy s1u is
sequentially rational. For 1u, defection strictly dominates
cooperation in the second stage of the game. Hence, the
only strategy that could be supported by sequential ratio-
nality for 1u after public official 2 observes any signal is to
defect. Hence, in any equilibrium, wemust have s1u = D.
Given public official 2’s stated strategy s2 (i.e. s2(g ) = c
and s2(b) = d), the expected payoff of expending eu ≥ 0
amount of effort for 1u is:
EU 1u (eu|s2) = eu
N












· · · (∗)
Since H ≤ N, we have HN − 1 < 0, and, hence, the
optimal level of effort for 1u is eu = 0. This verifies that
1u’s stated strategy s1u is sequentially rational.
Next, let us verify that the reasonable type of public
official 1(1r )’s stated strategy s1r is sequentially rational.
Note that any effort level greater than N is strictly domi-
nated by effort level er = N, as expending a greater effort
level than N would not increase the probability of learn-
ing public official 2’s comprehensive doctrine and would
only incur a greater cost. So, suppose the reasonable type
of public official 1 exerts effort level er ∈ [0, N]. Given
public official 2’s stated strategy s2, after expending er ,
the expected payoff of cooperating for 1r is:
EU 1r (c |er , s2)
= er
N





(−S − er ) · · · (1)
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The expected payoff of defecting is:
EU 1r (d|er , s2)
= er
N





(0 − er ) · · · (2)
Cooperating is sequentially rational if and only if
(1) ≥ (2), which, after solving for er , implies er ≥ NSJ +S−1 .
So, for the reasonable type of public official 1, the optimal
level of effort to expend to learn public official 2’s compre-
hensive doctrine while making cooperation sequentially
rational is er = NSJ +S−1 . We need this level of effort to be
less or equal to N. Note er = NSJ +S−1 ≤ N ⇒ SJ +S−1 ≤ 1,
which is always satisfied as J > 1. This verifies that 1r ’s
stated strategy s1r is sequentially rational.
Let us now verify that public official 2’s stated strat-
egy s2 is sequentially rational.When1r exerts er = NSJ +S−1 ,
the probability that s/he will learn public official 2’s com-
prehensive doctrine, and, thereby, produce a ‘good’ (g)
signal, is: erN = SJ +S−1 . Since 1u will exert zero effort (i.e.
eu = 0), public official 2 will observe a ‘good’ (g) signal
exclusively from the reasonable type of public official 1’s
efforts. Hence, the total probability that public official 2
will observe a ‘good’ (g) signal in our well-ordered society
under crisis is: (1 − )( SJ +S−1 ). Knowing that a ‘good’ (g)
signal can only be produced by 1r ’s efforts, after observ-
ing a ‘good’ (g) signal, public official 2 will believe, after
Bayesian updating, that s/he is interacting with 1r for
sure. Given that 1r cooperates, it is sequentially rational
for public official 2 to cooperate as well. Hence, public of-
ficial 2’s optimal strategy after observing the ‘good’ signal
is to cooperate: s ∗2 (g ) = c .
Now, suppose that public official 2 has received a
‘bad’ (b) signal. There are two cases in which this can
happen: (i) when public official 2 is interacting with 1u
(which occurs with probability: ), or (ii) when the 1r
fails to learn public official 2’s comprehensive doctrine
despite his/her efforts to learn (which occurs with proba-
bility: (1 − )(1 − SJ +S−1 )). So, by applying Bayes’ rule,
the conditional probability that public official 2 will be
interacting with an unreasonable type of public official 1
given that public official 2 observes a ‘bad’ (b) signal is:

+(1−)(1− SJ +S−1 )
, which is greater than , which, in our
model, is assumed to be greater than J −1J +S−1 . By Proposi-
tion 1, we know that whenever public official 2 believes
that the proportion of unreasonable public officials ex-
ceeds J −1J +S−1 , the only sequentially rational strategy is for
public official 2 to defect; hence, s ∗2 (b) = d .
Hence, we have verified that our assumed strategy for
public official 2 is sequentially rational given both types of
public official 1’s strategies and public official 2’s beliefs.
All information sets are reached with positive probability,
and the beliefs assigned in the assessment is in accor-
dance with Bayesian updating. Hence, the assessment is
a PBE.
As a final step, we verify that the proposed assess-
ment is also a CDE. note that s2(g ) = c , s2(b) = d ;
er = NSJ +S−1 > 0; and mutual justice is achieved with
probability P ∗ = (1 − )( SJ +S−1 ) > 0. 
Proposition 6. Suppose  >  = J −1J +S−1 and
suppose H ≤ N. Then, the following characterizes a
family of PBEs in which our well-ordered society completely
destabilizes:
















D(defect) after observing b
;
 1u’s beliefs: believe that s/he has generated signal
‘b’ with probability 1;
 1r ’s beliefs: believe that s/he has generated signal
‘b’ with probability 1;




after observing g , believes that 1 = 1u
with probability (where > )
after observing b, believes 1 = 1uwith
probability
Proof. Given s2(g ) = s2(b) = d , the stated strate-
gies of each type of public official 1 generate the follow-
ing payoffs:U1u(s1u|s2) = U1r (s1r |s2) = 0. For each type
i = u, r of public official 1, deviating to either ei > 0 or
C (cooperate) (or both) will result in a payoff of:−ei < 0
or−S < 0 or−S − ei < 0. Hence, neither type of public
official 1 has any incentive to deviate to a different strat-
egy. Now, let us check that public official 2’s strategy s2
is sequentially rational. After public official 2 receives a
signal (either good or bad), the game is reduced to the
baseline model of a well-ordered society under crisis de-
picted in figure 3 of section 2. By Proposition 1, it is never
sequentially rational for public official 2 to cooperatewith
any positive probability whenever s/he believes that the
probability that s/he is facing an unreasonable type is
greater than  = J −1J +S−1 . Hence, given public official 2’s
assigned beliefs, s2(g ) = s2(b) = d is sequentially ratio-
nal. We now check that the assigned beliefs obey Bayes’
rule in all information sets reached in the equilibrium
path. Since neither type of public official 1 exerts any ef-
fort, the probability that a ‘good signal(g )’ is produced is
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zero. Hence, each type of public official 1 should believe
that s/he has produced a ‘bad signal(b)’ with probability
one. Next, after observing a b, public official 2 should
believe through Bayesian updating that s/he is interacting
with 1u with probability: (1)
(1)+(1−)(1) = . Observing g
is off-the-equilibrium-path. Hence, we are allowed to as-
sign any beliefs for public official 2 in this information
set. Let  be public official 2’s belief that s/he is fac-
ing 1u after observing a g . Then, by Proposition 1, any
 >  = J −1J +S−1 will render s2(g ) = d sequentially ratio-
nal. We conclude that the stated assessment characterizes
a family of PBEs that are not CDEs. 
